原文链接：http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4686&page=0AC四月青年社区4 ]4 V) E1 q) S4 S8 e7 M1 B8 g# [" @9 o
本人是从原文库看到本文的，在此感谢原文库，：）
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China’s Team of RivalsAC四月青年社区( C8 F; W3 O: A, J3 D: b! h" s7 f- q2 \
中国的“政敌团队”
By Cheng Li
作者：李成（音译）AC四月青年社区0 x q0 ] c5 [
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2009年三/四月
A financial meltdown in China promises to test the Communist Party’s power in ways not seen since Tiananmen. But theirs is a house divided, as princelings take on populists and Pekinologists try to make sense of it all. Will this team built for economic success implode once the money dries up? An insider’s guide to the leaders at China’s controls.
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中国的金融若是崩溃，必将对中共权力构成自天安门事件以来最为严重的挑战。但中共的不同派别是身处同一屋檐下的。随着太子派越来越显示出平民派特征，研究北京的学者们也开始努力弄清个中蹊跷。一旦财源枯竭，这支为创造经济奇迹而建的团队是否会分崩离析？本文作者带你走近中国的权力核心领导人。
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Illustration by Brian Stauffer for FPwww.anti-cnn.com0 ^. n2 @7 u9 S( H- |4 t
The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried. What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.” 7 I) q8 p9 N2 f2 \1 P
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中共领导层位于北京的官邸——中南海——里的二十多位高级领导人正忧心忡忡。一年前还难以想象的事当下正威胁着他们的统治：自由落体式的经济下滑。中国炽热的经济增长的关键因素——出口——已经骤降。成千上万的工厂和企业关门倒闭，特别是在沿海发达地区。在2008年的后六个月里，1000万工人，另有100万新毕业的大学生都加入了业已庞大的失业大军。同期，中国股市市值蒸发掉65%，相当于三万亿美元。胡锦涛主席最近说经济危机“是对我们处理复杂情况能力的一次考验，也是对我党执政能力的一次考验。”
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With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive the political challenges it will bring.
随着经济下行，中共突然显得有点脆弱无力。自三十年前邓小平启动经济改革以来，中共执政的合法性一直依赖于其保持经济火速增长的能力。如果中国不能保持一个较高的增速或不能为史无前例的劳动大军提供足够的机会，大量的公共不满和社会不安可能爆发。对此，那几位掌舵中国庞大经济的人物比任何人看得都清楚。两位数的增速已帮他们度过了肆虐的非典、巨大的地震和迭起的食品危机。当前关键的问题是，他们能否处理如此规模的经济危机，并战胜将要面临的政治挑战。
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This year marks the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic, and the ruling party is no longer led by one strongman, like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Instead, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, China’s most powerful body, are run by two informal coalitions that compete against each other for power, influence, and control over policy. Competition in the Communist Party is, of course, nothing new. But the jockeying today is no longer a zero-sum game in which a winner takes all. It is worth remembering that when Jiang Zemin handed the reins to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002, it marked the first time in the republic’s history that the transfer of power didn’t involve bloodshed or purges. What’s more, Hu was not a protégé of Jiang’s; they belonged to competing factions. To borrow a phrase popular in Washington these days, post-Deng China has been run by a team of rivals.
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今年是人民共和国建国60周年，执政党已不是由某个强势人物如毛泽东或邓小平单独掌控。就连中国权力最大的机构——政治局及其常委会——也是由两个非正式联合体构成。两者为了权力、影响力和政策控制力彼此互争。当然，中共内部的互争已不是什么新鲜东西。但现今的赛局已不是赢家通吃的零和游戏。不要忘了，2002年胡锦涛接替江泽民是共和国史上第一次没有流血或清洗异己的权力移交。更值得注意的是，胡锦涛和江泽民并不是一派；他们分属互相竞争的派别。借用一个最近在华盛顿流行的说法，后邓小平时代的中国已被一支“政敌团队”掌控。求真务实 理性交流' x& _+ U% `$ B3 w, e0 `9 X
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This internal competition was enshrined as party practice a little more than a year ago. In October 2007, President Hu surprised many China watchers by abandoning the party’s normally straightforward succession procedure and designating not one but two heirs apparent. The Central Committee named Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang—two very different leaders in their early 50s—to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, where the rulers of China are groomed. The future roles of these two men, who will essentially share power after the next party congress meets in 2012, have since been refined: Xi will be the candidate to succeed the president, and Li will succeed Premier Wen Jiabao. The two rising stars share little in terms of family background, political association, leadership skills, and policy orientation. But they are each heavily involved in shaping economic policy—and they are expected to lead the two competing coalitions that will be relied upon to craft China’s political and economic trajectory in the next decade and beyond.
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一年多之前，内部竞争已被列为党的一项惯例。2007年十月，胡主席抛弃了一贯的党的继任方法并指定了两位而不是一位明显的接班人，这使很多中国观察家感到震惊。中央委员会指定两位大有不同、五十多岁的领导人习近平和李克强进入酝酿中国领导人的政治局常委。之后，两位的角色分工已做好，他们必将会在2012年党大会后分享权力：习将会是主席候选人，李将是温家宝的继承者。两位冉冉的新星从家庭背景，到政治派别，到领导方式，再到政策取向都少有共同点。但他们各自都对经济政策制定有着重要的影响，而且他们也有望分别领导两个互相竞争的、担负着设计中国未来十年甚至更远的政治经济路线图的联合体。" s! q' ]9 E3 d" S
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One thing is for sure: They have the profoundly difficult task of quickly and effectively transforming the country’s long-standing model of export-led development. That task will require a delicate balance of innovative reforms, further market liberalization, and occasionally, strong government intervention to reshape China’s economy into one driven largely by domestic demand. It is a daunting challenge, particularly when the men at the helm differ so profoundly. There are bound to be power struggles. But there is also a good chance that these everyday rivals, understanding that the party’s survival hangs in the balance, will put aside infighting to guide China out of the crisis.
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可以确定的，他们都面临着一个艰巨任务，那就是快速并有效地改变中国长期以来所走的出口导向型发展模式。完成该任务需要在深化改革、市场进一步自由化和偶然的政府强势干预之间把握好微妙的平衡，进而使中国经济变成内需拉动型。这是个巨大的挑战，特别是当掌舵的人又这么的不同。将来，必定会有权力博弈。但也有向好的可能，今天的这些政敌们如果明白党的命运在于某种均衡，将会把内部纠纷放置一边并带领中国走出危机。
The team of rivals arrangement is not a choice, but a new necessity for the Chinese leadership. In elevating both Xi and Li in 2007, Hu signaled the importance of the different constituencies each represents and the belief that only consensus-building will successfully forestall serious political upheaval in the so-called fifth generation of leaders, of which Xi and Li are members. The idea of turning rivals into allies “for the sake of the greater good,” as Abraham Lincoln put it, has been widely cited in the Chinese media. A recent article published in China Youth Daily, one of the most popular newspapers in the country, called the “team of rivals” (zhengdi tuandui) a “brilliant idea to achieve political compromise in order to maximize common interest and political capital for survival.”
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对中国领导层来说，政敌团队这种安排本不是一种选项，而是一种新的必须。2007年通过把习和李提上来，胡传达了他们分别代表的两派的重要性以及只有建立共识才能成功防止在习和李所代表的所谓的第五代领导人中间产生严重的政治动荡。“为了更大的利益”把敌人整合为同盟，亚伯拉罕-林肯曾经的想法，已经在中国媒体上广泛引用。中国最受欢迎的报纸之一“中国青年报”最近有篇文章称“政敌团队”是一个利益最大化并达到政治折中的超好方法。求真务实 理性交流% q+ P% Q- H: A! }1 f) J& E, T
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The two groups can be identified as the “populists” and the “elitists.” The populists are currently led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. Members of their core group, including Li Keqiang, Director of Party Organization Li Yuanchao, and Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, are known as tuanpai, after the Chinese Communist Youth League through which they advanced their careers. Most tuanpai—they now make up 23 percent of the Central Committee and 32 percent of the Politburo—served as local and provincial leaders, often in poor inland provinces, and many have expertise in propaganda and legal affairs. President Hu is himself a tuanpai, and the leaders of this faction are widely regarded as his longtime confidants; most of them worked directly under Hu in the early 1980s, when he headed the youth league. Tuanpai are known for their organizational and propaganda skills, but they are lacking when it comes to handling the international economy. Their credentials weren’t as highly valued in the Jiang Zemin era, when foreign investment and economic globalization were stressed above all else, but they are considered critical now as the risks of social unrest and political tensions increase.
两个联合体可以分别称之为“平民派”和“精英派”。平民派目前由主席胡锦涛和总理温家宝带头。这派的核心成员，包括李克强、组织部部长李源潮及广东党委书记汪洋，被称为“团派”，因他们都是通过中国共青团走上来而得名。团派目前在中央委员会占23%，在政治局占32%。多数团派成员在地方和省级部门任职，通常是比较穷的内陆省份。很多团派成员深谙宣传和法律事务。胡主席他也是团派一员，该派的领导人也都被认为是他的忠实心腹。八十年代早期胡在共青团当领导时，他们多数都在胡的直接领导下。团派的组织能力和宣传能力比较强，但在处理国际经济方面不太在行。在江泽民时代，他们没被重用，因当时外国投资和经济全球化为首要任务。但现在他们被认为非常重要，因社会不安和政治紧张状况的风险都在上升。* K8 _% A6 c9 F% M0 @9 k" b
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The elitist coalition was born in that Jiang era, and though its two current leaders—Wu Bangguo, chairman of the national legislature, and Jia Qinglin, head of a national political advisory body—are little known outside China, they are among the country’s highest-ranking political leaders. Members of the core group of the fifth generation elitists, including Xi Jinping, Vice Premier Wang Qishan, and Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, are known as princelings because they are the children of former high-ranking officials. The fathers of Xi, Wang, and Bo, for example, all once served as vice premiers. Princelings command 28 percent of the seats in the Politburo today. Most princelings grew up in the richer coastal regions and pursued careers in finance, trade, foreign affairs, and technology. Although patron-client ties are not always strong among the princelings themselves, the shared need to protect their interests, especially in a time of growing public resentment against nepotism, is what binds them together.
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精英派诞生于江时代。尽管该派的两位领导人人大委员长吴邦国和政协主席贾庆林在国外少有耳闻，但他们却都是国家最高的政治领导人。第五代精英派的核心成员，包括习近平，副总理王岐山和重庆市委书记薄熙来都被称为太子派，因为他们都是前高官的后代。像习、王和薄的父辈们都曾担任过副总理。现在太子派在政治局占28%。大多太子派成员都生长于比较富裕的沿海地区，他们的上升渠道多通过金融、贸易、外事和科技等领域。尽管太子派成员之间关系并不怎么密切，但他们都需要保护他们各自的利益，特别是在公共对裙带现象越来越反感的今天，他们也因此总到了一起。/ e' ?+ H' ~: i/ v# W
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Of the six members of the fifth generation serving on the Politburo today, three are tuanpai and three are princelings. The policy differences between these factions are as significant as the contrasts in their backgrounds. To a great extent, their differences reflect the country’s competing socioeconomic forces: Princelings aim to advance the interests of entrepreneurs and the emerging middle class, while the tuanpai often call for building a harmonious society, with more attention to vulnerable social groups such as farmers, migrant workers, and the urban poor. + n. y, D7 I0 {8 q
现在政治局里的六位第五代成员，三位属于团派，三位属于太子派。派别之间政策取向的不同不亚于他们各自背景的不同。很大程度上，他们之间的不同反映了该国两股互相竞争的社会经济力量：太子派以企业主和崛起的中产阶层利益为目标，而团派却经常呼吁建立一个和谐社会，更多关注社会弱势群体如农民、民工和城镇贫困人群。/ C1 Y8 Z& @6 D+ K n8 j5 P8 [ |
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The platforms of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, for example, are strikingly divergent. Xi’s enthusiasm for market liberalization and the continued development of the private sector is well known to the international business community. Not surprisingly, his primary policy concerns include making the economy more efficient, keeping GDP growth high, and deepening China’s integration into the world economy. Xi is particularly interested in keeping wealthy elites in China’s eastern coastal region happy.
比如，习近平和李克强的政策取向就非常不同。习对市场自由化和继续发展私有领域的热在国际商业界并不陌生。他把政策关注点主要放在提高经济效率、保持GDP高速增长、深化中国参与世界经济的程度就不足为奇了。如果中国东部沿海地区的富裕精英们高兴，习就会特别高兴。- p# Y( s2 d- u" n
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By contrast, Li Keqiang is more concerned about the plight of the country’s unemployed. He has made affordable housing more widely available and understands the importance of developing a rudimentary social safety net, beginning with the provision of basic healthcare. The rejuvenation of the northeastern provinces, China’s old industrial base and one of its most labor-intensive areas, appears to be Li’s regional focus. For Li, reducing economic disparities is far more urgent than enhancing economic efficiency. These diverging policy priorities between Xi and Li will likely grow in importance as the men respond to pressing economic questions, such as how China should react to foreign pressure on the value of the yuan and how the government should proceed with its stimulus plan.
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相比之下，李克强对失业群体的困境更为关注。他使经济适用房政策得以更广泛的实施，明白建立一个社会基本安全网的重要性，并从提供基本医疗开始着手。中国的老工业基地东北，也是劳动力最为富裕的地区之一。东北振兴即是李的关注点之一。在李看来，降低贫富悬殊比提高经济效率要要紧的多。随着需要回应各种经济问题，如中国面对人民币升值的外部压力以及政府如何实施经济刺激方案等，习李之间政策取向的不同将可能会越来越值得关注。www.anti-cnn.com0 z) p; t; C; ]3 @4 t
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Despite their many differences, the fifth generation of tuanpai and princelings share a common trauma: They are part of China’s “lost generation.” Born after the founding of the People’s Republic, they were teenagers when the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. They lost the opportunity for formal schooling as a result of the political turmoil, and many of them were the “sent-down youths,” young men and women who were moved from cities to rural areas and who worked for many years as farmers.
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尽管有这么多的不同，但团派和太子派第五代有着共同的精神特征：他们同属中国的“迷惘的一代”。出生于人民共和国建立之后，当1966年文革爆发时他们都还是十几岁的青年。因为政治混乱他们失去了正式学习的机会。他们中的很多也都曾是“下乡青年”，那时，青年男女们从城市被下放到农村，当了很多年的农民。( q5 K6 h( ~# n9 y5 S6 s0 }1 h- q5 u
Princelings Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan were sent from Beijing to Yanan, in Shaanxi Province, where they spent years on farms. Tuanpai Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao labored in some of the poorest rural areas in Anhui and Jiangsu provinces. Such arduous and humbling experiences forced these future leaders to cultivate certain traits, such as endurance, adaptability, foresightedness, and humility. They not only had the unusual opportunity to come to know rural China, but they also had to adjust to a completely different socioeconomic environment. This adjustment forced them to learn at an early age how to handle challenges and how to compromise. Xi Jinping recently told the Chinese media that his time in Yanan was a “defining experience,” a “turning point” in his life.
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太子派的习近平和王岐山当时被从北京下放到陕西延安，并在农场生活过很多年。团派的李克强和李源潮当时在安徽和江苏最贫困的农村劳动。如此艰苦且低级的经历也使得这些未来的领导人养成了某些特性，如忍耐力、适应力、预见力和谦恭忍让。他们不仅通过那次不寻常的机会了解了中国农村，而且还得适应完全不同的社会经济环境。这些经历使他们在小小年纪就学会了如何应对挑战、如何达到折中。习近平最近告诉中国媒体，他在延安的岁月在他人生中具有“决定性”，是他人生的“转折点”。AC四月青年社区6 ?- O) \ N8 ^- [5 n1 e
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If there is another event that approaches the importance of the Cultural Revolution in the lives of these men, it is undoubtedly the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. We don’t have much information about how the incident affected them individually, but they are a generation older than many of the protesters, and at the time, several were municipal leaders or chiefs of the youth league. It is clear that they appreciate, as a group, that China’s leadership during Tiananmen was deeply divided over how to respond to the unrest. They also realize that the internal struggle aggravated the crisis and ultimately culminated in a brutal response.
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如果还有什么事对他们人生的影响可以和文革相媲美的话，无疑是1989年的天安门事件。尽管我们无法知晓那次事件分别是怎样影响了他们，但我们都知道他们都是多数抗议者的前一代。当时他们中的一些人已是市政领导或共青团主要领导。他们属于同一中共，他们也肯定知道中国领导层在天安门事件中如何处理动乱问题上的严重分歧。他们也认识到，当时内部斗争加剧了危机并最终以无情镇压结局。www.anti-cnn.com: l" \7 x( t* ]2 U
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These events taught the fifth generation two lessons: First, they must maintain political stability at all costs, and second, they should not reveal their fissures to the public. Although these leaders wear their differences on their sleeves, there is solidarity at the highest level, inspired by past unrest, to avoid any sign of a split in the leadership, which would be dangerous for the party and for the country. www.anti-cnn.com8 G5 T) B- d1 [
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这些事情给第五代上了两课：第一，他们必须不惜一切保持政治稳定，第二，他们不能把内部纠纷外漏。尽管这些领导们有着很多不同，不过为了避免领导层出现裂痕，为了避免给党和国家造成危害，鉴于以往经验，最高层向来都表现团结一致。7 ~+ x: U! Q$ |$ F8 } N; C
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So, what do these profound differences and influential shared experiences tell China watchers about how the next generation will steer the Chinese economy? The economic prowess of the princelings will be essential to responding to the macroeconomic challenges the country will face this year and beyond. And the sensibilities of the tuanpai, versed as they are in organization and propaganda, will be invaluable as China responds to social problems born of—and exacerbated by—economic stagnation.
那么，中国观察家们能否从他们这些巨大的差异及共有的经历之中知晓下一代将如何掌舵中国经济？今年乃至今后中国面对宏观经济挑战时，太子派的经济能力将不可或缺。当中国处理因经济停滞产生并加剧的社会问题时，团派的组织和宣传能力则是无价之宝。
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The rise of the team of rivals arrangement may result in fewer policies aimed at maximizing GDP growth rates at all costs. Instead, it might give way to policies that provide due consideration to both economic efficiency and social justice. Already, the ongoing global financial crisis has driven the leadership to change its emphasis from export-led growth to encouraging domestic demand, which means addressing rural needs. An ambitious land reform plan, which was adopted in the fall of 2008, promises to give farmers more rights and market incentives to encourage them to subcontract and transfer land. This strategy aims to increase the income of farmers, reduce economic disparity, promote sustainable urbanization, and ultimately end the century-long segregation between rural and urban China. Some analysts think that this land reform, along with a nearly $600 billion stimulus plan announced in November that favors railroad construction and rural infrastructure development, will greatly boost the country’s domestic economy and hopefully propel China through the current economic crisis.
政敌团队安排模式的出现可能会减少不惜一切以GDP增速最大化为目标的政策数量。而兼顾经济效率和社会公正的政策可能会增多。当前的全球金融危机已经使领导层把政策重点从出口增长转向鼓励内需，这意味着开始关注农村需求。2008年末实施的一项大胆的土地改革有望给予农民更多的权利和市场激励鼓励他们转包、转移土地。该项措施目标在于增加农民收入、降低贫富差距、促进城市化的可持续发展并最终终结长达一个世纪的城乡二元结构。一些分析专家认为，这次土地改革，加上十一月公布的有益于铁路建设和农村基础设施的约6000亿美元的刺激计划，将会大力拉动内需并有望使中国安稳度过这次经济危机。
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Although the land reforms largely reflect President Hu’s agenda and the influence of the populists, leaders from the elitist camp have also been supporters of these policy initiatives. Political compromise and consensus-building, not zero-sum factional infighting, have shaped the rural development and stimulus plans. 1 ]1 {6 ^/ ?" H7 X2 A4 C2 }
尽管土地改革很大程度上只是胡主席的意思，同时也印证了平民派的影响力，但来自精英阵营的领导们也对这些政策持支持态度。政治折中和建立共识，而不是零和的内耗斗争，成就了这次改革措施和刺激方案。
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But China’s new game of elite politics may fail. What will happen, for instance, if economic conditions continue to worsen? Factionalism at the top might grow out of control, perhaps even leading to deadlock or outright feuding. Different outlooks over many issues—including how to redistribute resources, establish a public healthcare system, reform the financial sector, achieve energy security, maintain political order, and handle domestic ethnic tensions—are already so contentious that the leadership might find it increasingly difficult to build the kind of consensus necessary to govern effectively. 求真务实 理性交流, O4 p8 I' P: K1 Y7 o
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不过，中国的精英政治可能会失败。试想，一旦经济状况进一步恶化，结果会如何？高层的派别斗争或许会失控，可能会更糟导致政治僵局或长期裂痕。很多问题都具有争议性，包括如何重新配置资源，如何建立公共医疗体系，如何改革金融体制，如何确保能源安全，如何保持政治秩序，以及如何处理民族之间的紧张关系等。不同派别对这些问题的看法如此不同，领导层可能会发现为了有效治理建立某种必要共识会难上加难。' |+ b. e) d# C, J, U' Y
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Barring something entirely unexpected, though, the populist policy platform will prevail over the next three to four years, and the ongoing global financial crisis will likely push Chinese leaders to increase government intervention in the economy. Yet there may be a swing in the opposite direction in 2012 as princeling Xi Jinping succeeds Hu Jintao, similar to the transition from Jiang to Hu. The establishment of such shifts during transitions at the top can create a healthy political dynamic that prevents one faction from wielding excessive power. Because of new leaders’ differences in expertise, credentials, and experiences, contending coalitions will realize that they need to find ways to coexist in order to remain in power. They do, after all, have a common interest in social stability and the shared aspiration to further China’s rise on the world stage. Given China’s long history of arbitrary decision-making by one individual leader, this “one party, two coalitions” practice represents a major step forward—for the party and the people.
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尽管如此，除非发生重大意外事件，今后三四年的时间里平民派的政策将会占上风，同时，正在风行的全球金融危机可能会使中国领导人提高政府干预经济的程度。就像江胡权力交替，2012年当太子派习近平接替胡锦涛后，政策可能会有一百八十度大转向。高层的这种转换交替机制的建立有效地创造一个健康的政治动力，以免某派力量用权过度。由于新的领导人在能力、资质和经历等方面有显著差异，竞争的两个派别将会认识到为了保持执政权力他们需要找到某种途径共存。不过，他们确实也有共同利益，即社会稳定和中国在世界舞台上进一步崛起。考虑到中国有着超长的个人独断专行历史，不管是对于中共还是人民来说，这种“一个中共，两个阵营”的实践确实进步不小。- f/ U' n8 G( ^0 h
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Cheng Li is research director and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center and, most recently, editor of China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).& |" t( E1 i, j2 N6 K( q
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